200-08 Philosophical Perspectives: Self-Knowledge

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In this course, you will further pursue fundamental human questions about topics such as knowledge, morals, and politics by investigating how great philosophers have addressed these questions. You will have the chance to read, discuss, and critique classic works of philosophy. In this way, you will be invited into a long tradition of reflection on the meaning of our shared humanity, of the world, and of our relation to it.

This course is part of the Xavier Core Curriculum, which aims to develop people of learning and reflection, integrity and achievement, in solidarity for and with others. The course addresses the following core learning objective at an intermediate level:

1a: Students recognize and cogently discuss significant questions in the humanities, arts, and the natural and social sciences.

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Office hours
T/TH 9:30-10:00
T/TH 2:15-3:00
W 9:30-11:30
Also by appointment and by chance

Requirements and Tentative Schedule

Exams
Augustine exam: 20% (Tentatively either September 27)
  Question: What, for Augustine, is self-knowledge, and what is the role of the material world, friends and God in self?
Aquinas exam: 20% (Tentatively November 3rd)
  Question: What, for Aquinas, is self-knowledge, and what is the role of the material world, friends and God in self?
Descartes exam: 20% (Thursday, December 15 8:30-10:30)
  Question: What, for Descartes, is self-knowledge, and what is the role of the material world, friends and God in self?

Paper: 25% (Tentatively Thursday, November 17)

8 page minimum
  A. Focus on one aspect (the role of the material world, friends or God) in either Augustine’s or Aquinas’ account of self-knowledge. This should constitute most of the paper.
1. Explain the conclusion the philosopher reached.
2. Explain the arguments used to establish that conclusion.
3. Critique the position from the perspective of the other philosopher.
4. Explain how the philosopher (from nn. 1 and 2) would respond to the critique.

B. Incorporate another source that supplements the analysis above; this supplement should in no way constitute the majority of the paper.
1. Read and incorporate an article found through the Philosopher’s Index. Include a copy of the article with your paper.
2. Incorporate a work of literature that you have already read.
3. Incorporate your own experience.

Plagiarism will result in an “F” for the course and a letter to the dean.

Class participation: 15%
Participation refers to discussion: it presumes attendance.
Six or more unexcused absences will result in an “F” for the course.
Texting or computer use other than following a digital text will count as an unexcused absence.

Texts
Augustine, *The Confessions* (Image/Doubleday)
Thomas Aquinas, *Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas* (Modern Library)
Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method* (Hackett Press)

Reading assignments

**Augustine, Confessions**

**Book I**
Chapter 1: p. 1
Chapter 2: p. 2
Chapter 6: pp. 4-7
Chapter 12: pp. 13-14
Chapter 13: pp. 19-20
Chapter 18: p. 22

**Book II**
Chapter 4: p. 28
Chapter 5: pp. 28-29
Chapter 9: pp. 33-4

**Book III**
Chapter 1: pp. 35-36
Chapter 2: pp. 36-37
Chapter 4: pp. 39-40
Chapter 5: p. 40
Chapter 6: p. 41
Chapter 7: pp. 43-44
Chapter 8: 45-47
Book IV
Chapter 4: pp. 56-57
Chapter 6: pp. 58-59
Chapter 7: pp. 59-60
Chapter 9: p. 61
Chapter 10: p. 62
Chapter 11: pp. 63-64
Chapter 12: pp. 64-65

Book V
Chapter 8: pp. 83-84
Chapter 10: pp. 87-89
Chapter 13: pp. 91-92
Chapter 14: pp. 92-93

Book VI
Chapter 4: pp. 98-100
Chapter 5: pp. 100-101
Chapter 7: p. 104
Chapter 8: pp. 106-107
Chapter 11: pp. 110-112
Chapter 14: p. 115
Chapter 15: p. 116
Chapter 16: pp. 116-117

Book VII
Chapter 3: pp. 121-122
Chapter 4: p. 122
Chapter 5: pp. 123-124
Chapter 7: pp. 128-129
Chapter 10: pp. 132-133
Chapter 11: p. 133
Chapter 12: p. 133
Chapter 20: p. 140

Book VIII
Chapter 5: pp. 150-152
Chapter 7: p. 156
Chapter 9: pp. 159-160
Chapter 10: p. 160
Chapter 11: pp. 162-164
Chapter 12: pp. 164-166

Book IX
Chapter 1: p. 166
Chapter 4: pp. 171-175
Chapter 10: pp. 184-185

Book X
Chapter 1: p. 193
Chapter 5: p. 197
Chapter 12: p. 206
Chapter 16: pp. 209-211
Chapter 17: pp. 211-212
Aquinas

1. Aristotle and Aquinas on the four causes and nature (attached handout)
2. No innate knowledge: *Summa theologiae* I q. 84, a. 3 (pp. 383-385)
3. Knowledge begins but does not end in sensation
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 84, a. 6 (pp. 392-395)
4. Self-knowledge
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 87, a. 1 (pp. 425-428)
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 87, a. 3 (attached handout)
5. Knowledge of God’s existence
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 2, a. 3 (pp. 24-27)
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 12, a. 12 (pp. 93-94)
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 12, a. 5 (pp. 79-80)
6. Goodness
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 5, a. 1 (pp. 34-6)
   *Summa theologiae* I q. 5, a. 6 (pp. 43-5)
7. Friendship and self-knowledge (attached handout)

Descartes

1. Method, tradition and mathematics
   *Discourse*, Parts I-III (pp. 1-18)
2. Method and self
   *Discourse*, Part IV (pp. 18-19)
3. Proofs for the existence of God
   *Discourse*, Part IV (pp. 19-21)
4. Proof of the existence of matter
   *Discourse*, Part IV (pp. 21-22)
5. Re-creation of the world, relation between mind and body
   *Discourse*, Part V (pp. 23-34)
6. Purpose of knowledge
   *Discourse*, Part VI (pp. 35-44)
Aristotle on the four causes

*Physics* II.3, 194b17-195a3

Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their character and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of physical change, in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems.

In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called 'cause', e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.

In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called 'causes' (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.

Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed.

Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments.

This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term 'cause' is used.

As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several causes of the same thing not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute), e.g. both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue. These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of anything else that it may be-only not in the same way, the one being the material cause, the other the cause whence the motion comes.

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1 [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html](http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html)
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.

Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible.

Objection 3. Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand."

I answer that, As stated above (1,2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Question 79, Article 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 1. The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above (Question 84, Article 7), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.
Reply to Objection 2. The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Question 86, Article 2).

Reply to Objection 3. The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.
Aristotle and Aquinas on the friend as another self and mirror for self-knowledge

Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Book VIII

1565. So he does three things. First [B, i] he treats friendship based on utility and that based on pleasure. . . .

1566. He says first that of those who love one another for the sake of utility, one does not love the other for the sake of the other but inasmuch as he receives from the other some good for himself. The same is true of those who love each other on account of pleasantness, for the one does not love the other precisely as witty or virtuous in merriment but merely as pleasant to himself. So it is obvious that those who love for the sake of utility love for the good they get, and those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy. Thus they do not love their friend for what he is in himself but for what is incidental to him, his utility or pleasantness. Therefore, friendships of this sort plainly are not friendships essentially but incidentally, because a person is not loved for what he is but for utility or pleasure.

1567. Then [a, ii], at “Since men,” he shows that friendships of this kind are easily dissolved. They are for the sake of something that is incidental to the persons loved and in this men do not always remain the same. The same man, for instance, is not always pleasant or useful. Therefore, when those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends stop loving them. This is very obvious in friendship based on utility, for the same thing is not always useful to a man. It is one thing now, and then another in different times and places. So a doctor is useful for sickness, a sailor for navigation and so on. Since then friendship was cultivated not for the man himself but for the utility he afforded, when the cause of the friendship vanishes the friendship too is consequently dissolved.

1572. Then [ii, y], at “As they grow older,” he shows that these friendships readily change in two ways: first [y, aa], on the part of the pleasurable objects, because other things become pleasing to them with the passing of time. It is not in the same thing that children, adolescents, and youths alike find pleasure; and so they easily make friends and easily forsake them because with the change of pleasure comes a change of friendship. But youthful pleasure is characteristically swift to change since the nature of youth consists wholly in a state of change.

1573. At “Moreover, young people” [y, bb] he shows the same thing on the part of those who love. He says that young people are volatile, i.e., quick and vehement in their love because they love not from rational choice but from passion and inasmuch as they are very desirous of pleasure. Therefore they love passionately and intensely. Since passion vanishes as quickly as it appears, such persons as easily fall in love as they cease to love; many times they even fall in and out of love the same day. But as long as the friendship endures these people want to remain together all day long and live in the other’s presence inasmuch as they enjoy the company of each other. This is the way their friendship works.

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3 All references to Aquinas’ Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle are from http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics9.htm
1574. Next [B, 2], at “Perfect friendship, however,” he treats the principal kind of friendship which is for the good of virtue. First [2, a] he points out that this friendship is perfect. He says that the friendship between good men and those alike in virtue is perfect friendship.

1575. Then [2, b], at “for those who,” he proves his statement by explaining the qualities of this friendship. First [2, b, i] he shows that this is friendship essentially and not incidentally. . . .

1579. Then [2, b, ii, y], at “It is reasonable,” he concludes further that it is reasonable for such friendship to be long lasting and not readily transient, because it contains absolutely everything necessary for friends. Every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure: either in itself (for example, when what is loved is in itself good and pleasurable) or in relation to the one loving which is to be good and pleasurable not in itself and properly but according to a kind of likeness to what is really and properly good and pleasurable. in fact all the preceding things are found in this friendship not incidentally but essentially; and those who are alike according to this friendship have the remaining goods too, because what is simply good is also pleasing. Since this friendship has all the requisites of friendship, it is not easily broken up, for a defective thing is usually set aside.

1625. He says first that besides the foregoing friendships, which we said (1562-1595) consist in equality from the fact that they belong to persons having likeness in virtue or utility or pleasure, there is another kind of friendship that consists in inequality (inasmuch as one person excels another), as the friendship of a father with a son, or—in general—of an older with a younger person, or of a husband with a wife, or for the most part of a superior with a subordinate.

1634. Second [ii, y], at “This is evident,” he gives three examples. First, of beings who greatly surpass men in all good things. Hence they do not maintain friendship with men so as to converse and live with them. These separated substances Aristotle calls gods, according to pagan custom. . . .

Book IX

1811. Next [B, 2], at “However, he feels,” he shows how a virtuous man should adapt these characteristics to his friend. Aristotle notes that a virtuous man is disposed to his friend as to himself because a friend is—so to speak—another self by affection, that is, a person feels for a friend what he feels for himself. Consequently, it seems that friendship consists in any of these characteristics that people experience toward themselves; and that those are real friends who have these characteristics.

1896. We can have pleasure only in what we know. But we can examine our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own because every man is a bad judge of his own case on account of the private affection he has for himself. Evidently then virtuous persons find pleasure in the actions of those who are both virtuous men and friends of theirs; in them are found both qualities pleasurable by nature, namely, the good and the lovable. In this way, therefore, the happy man will need these virtuous friends inasmuch as he seeks to study the virtuous actions of the good man who is his friend. Since a man’s friend is another self, so to speak, the friend’s actions will be his own in a sense.
1909. At “But the good man” [ii, y] he shows from the premises what is desirable and pleasant to the virtuous and happy person with regard to his friend. He observes that the good man feels for his friend as if he were himself, since his friend is in a way another self. Therefore, just as his own existence is desirable and delightful to existence desirable and delightful to him—if not equally, at least very nearly so. For the natural unity a man has with himself is greater than the unity of affection he has with his friend. We have just noted (1907, 1908) that the good man’s existence and life are desirable to him because he perceives that they are good. But this perception, by which someone perceives good existing in him, is delightful in itself. Consequently, as a person rejoices in the perception of his own existence and life so it is simply necessary for him to perceive them in his friend in order to rejoice in him.

Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* 1213a10-26

Since then it is both a most difficult thing, as some of the sages have said, to attain a knowledge of oneself, and also a most pleasant (for to

15 know oneself is pleasant) now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves (and that we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is the effect of favour or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that we judge not

20 aright); as then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, 1 a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having some one 25 else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself.

Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II-II.23.1, Whether charity is friendship?

On the contrary, It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.

\[4\] https://archive.org/stream/magnamoralia00arisuoft/magnamoralia00arisuoft_djvu.txt

5 All references to *Summa theologiae* are from http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3024.htm
Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Corinthians 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.

Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II-II.24.2, Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?

I answer that, As stated above (Question 23, Article 1), charity is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, according to Romans 6:23, "the grace of God is life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause.

Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Question 23, Article 2).